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PROFESSIONAL NOTES 
Restore Progress Through Mentoring 
By Captain Wayne P. Hughes Jr.t U.S. Navy (Retired) 
I
f our best officers are not enlightened early in their careers, they will 
leave the Navy to do something they think is more rewarding, such as 
making money. The loss of a talented officer is invisible in a system that 
can only work with what it has. To restore 
progress in the U.S. Navy, I believe we 
should adopt a method of grooming lead-
ers that has worked in the past: Having the 
best senior officers mentor the best junior 
officers, quietly and almost invisibly. 
When I was n junior officer, two things 
kept me in the Navy, which at that time 
did not seem to be preparing me for a 
career of excitement or even danger. The 
first was on executive officer of my first 
ship, who proved to me in many late-night 
discussions that there was more to being 
a seagoing line officer than being a good 
officer of the deck. This Rhodes Scholar 
also recommended that I take graduate 
education in the then-new and scarcely 
known field of operations analysis. 
The second thing that kept me in the 
Navy was early command. This was the 
result of mentoring by a detailer who 
.believed I had a promising future. Con-
trary to my own career plan, he ordered 
me into the mine force as the executive 
officer of a minesweeper for my second 
tour of duty. This led to command of a 
small coastal minesweeper at the very 
moment I was promoted to lieutenant. I 
have been told that command today can 
be a stifling experience. I thought there 
was some of that during my time in the 
mine forces, but it didn't take long to feel 
the rewards, and after my first commond 
as a very junior lieutenant I knew I would 
not leave the Navy before I had had my 
own destroyer. 
Change Through Mentoring 
The best known model of successful 
mentoring is U.S. Army Major General 
Fox Conner, who nurtured the careers of 
George C. Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, 
and George Patton in the face of unimagi-
native Army opposition (see Lieutenant 
Commander Jason Shell's December 2015 
Proceedings article, "Lending Outside 
Command," pp. 52-57). Marshall in turn 
kept a list of the most promising mid-grade 
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officers and as Chief of Staff was famous 
for putting good leaders in positions of 
authority- not perfectly, but successfully. 
I believe that our SEALs are the best 
cum:nt Navy example of selection, train-
ing, strong performance, and currency. 
They are a component of the U.S. Special 
Operations Command (SOCOM), a self-
contained command that hos close control 
over its procurement, tactics, and opera-
tions. SOCOM hos taken the lead in pro-
moting unmanned aerial vehicles, the tech-
nologies of silent operations, and stealthy 
attacks. The U.S. Marine Corps is a close-
second exomple of successful mentoring 
and training combined with an emphasis 
on combined-nnns combat training. 
To foster change through mentoring, 
Navy leadership must: 
• Choose officers with a broad, all-en• 
compassing perspective rather than those 
who are the most proficient fighter pilot, 
missile officer, or nuclear submoriner. At 
the same time, it must anticipate our most 
vital emerging communities and let offi-
cers become operational experts by hoving 
repeated tours in them. Cyber warfare, un-
manned vehicles~ and coastal combatants 
are three such emerging fields that entail 
unique skills for swift progress. 
• Understand that mentoring is a combi-
nation of one-on-one tutoring and team 
development. At the Naval Postgraduate 
School, for example, one-on-one thesis 
advising has been the norm, but recently 
team projects have become appreciated as 
a strong way to teach officers with differ-
ent skills how to work together to advance 
complicated, multifaceted designs of sys-
tems and operations. 
• Not expect an error-free process. A cur-
rent weakness of Navy decision making is 
to promote officers who have never made 
an obvious mistake rather than look for 
those with courage and imagination. A 
young officer who had had an exchange 
tour in the Norwegian Navy once told me 
that it was a fleet of small combatants 
famous for flitting at high speed among 
fjords, shoals. and islands to defend a dan-
gerous coast He said o Norwegian officer 
who had never run aground was suspected 
of being too coutious for promotion. 
A skeptic might hove two objections 
to the concept of mentoring. The first is 
that it has been tried before, so it must 
have been found wanting. Two Chiefs of 
Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo "Bud" 
Zumwalt Jr. ond Admiral Vern Clark, 
both promoted specialty development 
and mentoring. I think both would have 
succeeded and kept the Navy vibrant if 
the three rules here had been understood 
and inculcated. The second objection 
is that mentoring breeds favoritism and 
lenders can be blind lo manipulation by 
clever junior officers. This is true: Mis-
takes will be made. No system is perfect, 
but if we ore going to improve current 
decision making, which has become too 
risk-averse, there is probably no correc-
tion that is free of mistakes. 
Current Programs 
The Navy does offer some opportunities 
for mentoring by assigning aides to flag 
officers, but aides gain experience in 
administrative efficiency rather than in 
improving tactics and technology. A 
more focused program for senior officers 
was initiated by Admiral Tom Hayward 
beginning in 1981, in which the CNO 
selects promising captains for a year of 
study and the introduction of new ideas in a 
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Strategic Studies Group (SSG) in Newport. 
Partly for mentoring and partly to add the 
energy and free thinking of junior officers, 
the SSG now invites five or six lieutenants 
from the Naval Postgraduate School to join 
the captains for part of the year. However, 
it is no longer policy to include graduate 
education as an important stepping-stone 
for future leaders. 
When I was a junior officer, we knew 
that taking two or even three years away 
from career development at sea was seen 
by Navy leadership as valunble-even 
essential. Now as a professor at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, I see that quota-
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In April 2015, than-Chief of Naval Oparallons 
(CNO) Admiral Jonathan Graenart meals with 
fallows of Iha CNO Strategic Studlas Group 
(SSG) at the U.S. Naval War Collage. Accord• 
Ing lo Iha author, the SSG Is an example of 
Navy mantorlng programs, but "It Is no longer 
policy to lncluda graduata education as an 
Important stapplng-stana for fulura laadars." 
until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Our 
undersea-warfare curriculum (including 
mine warfare) was maintained for two 
decades during a hiatus of interest. It at-
tracted few students until the Navy once 
again appreciated the value of submarine 
i and mine warfare as well as autonomous 
unmanned undersea vehicle technologies. 
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filling rather than career development 
has become dominant. In the recent past, 
selection by detailers has also been used 
as a retention tool. The P-Coding system 
has become a liability that destroys 
the concept that education is for career 
development. It would be better if the 
Navy only sent officers who were highly 
likely to rise to senior command and 
only in curricula specializ_ing in the skills 
deemed most valuable. 
In the past, space technology and astro-
naut education was a program that served 
well. An antisubmarine-warfare curricu-
lum was well formulated and attended 
More-Than a Number 
Currently the most valuable curricula are 
probably computer technology, informa-
tion science and technology for cyber war, 
unmanned systems, military tactical and 
campaign analysis, speci_al operations, and 
total-ship system engineering. Graduate 
education is not mentoring, but as I said, 
my graduate education was shaped by an 
early mentor. Overseeing the selection of 
our most promising future leaders will go 
far toward restoring flexibility and adapt-
ability to all aspects of our Navy. 
Dean Emeritus, Prolessor, and Captain Hughes 
teaches campaign and tactical analysis al Iha Naval 
Postgraduate School ln Monterey, Calllornla. Ha 
wrot• Ff1111I Tactics and Coastal Combat, published 
by Iha Naval lnstllule Press, and 11 a Prat11edlnos 
distinguished author. 
By Lieutenant Commander Cary Godwin, U.S. Coast Guard 
The U.S. Coast Guard conducts dan-
gerous missions every day. Whether it's 
search-and-rescue operations using small 
boats or helicopters, a cutter servicing an 
aid to navigation dangerously close to 
shoal water, or a marine inspection team 
on a commercial tanker vessel, Coast 
Guardsmen must assess and manage risk 
to safely and successfully complete each 
mission. The unwritten mono of the early 
Coast Guard was: "You have to go out, 
but you don't have to come back." Today 
we say: "You don't have to go out, but if 
you do, you have to come back and bring 
all your equipment back so you can do 
it again tomorrow." It is imperative to 
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protect your people and assets in order to 
provide continued service to the country, 
and this is accomplished through proper 
risk management. 
Managing risk does not mean being 
risk. averse. Every mission involves in-
herent risks, and the maritime environ-
ment is often unforgiving. Rarely is it a 
sunny, calm day that the Coast Guard is 
called to provide assistance to a mariner 
in need. The service developed the team-
coordination training and the Operational 
Risk Management {ORM) program fol-
lowing several accidents, most notably the 
sinking of the fishing vessel Sea King off 
the coast of Washington in 1991; a Coast 
Guardsman was lost when the vessel cap-
sized as it was being towed. The Coast 
Guard's ORM program has matured over 
the years and is entrenched in nearly 
every aspect of Const Guard operations 
and planning. 
Current Requirements 
The ORM program requires unit com-
manders to follow a seven•step process for 
mission planning and execution. The steps 
are: I) identify mission tasks, 2) identify 
hazards, 3) assess risks, 4) identify miti• 
gation options, 5) evaluate risk versus 
gain, 6) execute decision, and 7) monitor 
situation. The ORM instruction provides 
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